One of Google's data centers in The Dalles, Oregon, on the banks of the Columbia River. Photo by Vickie Connor/The Oregonian.
EP. 11: THE SERVER FARM (PART 1)
Since late 2022, one industry has accelerated its expansion to the point of totally reshaping the country's land, water, and power grid at a speed and scale without precedent. Hundreds of billions of dollars in new construction. Industrial complexes the size of small cities. Power demands measured in gigawatts. Most of it is happening in communities that didn't ask for it, that aren't being told what's being built, and that, in some cases, are now paying for the electricity through their own utility bills. Part 1 of "The Server Farm" follows the data center boom from Northern Virginia to rural Georgia to the south side of Indianapolis, and asks what these facilities actually cost the people who live next to them.
Explore the episode's transcript and sources below.
TRANSCRIPT
Intro
A quick word before we begin, because this episode of Ecocide is different. The stories we tell on this show come in various forms. Some are environmental history—disasters that happened years or even decades ago. Others will be about environmental harm that's still unfolding. We call those real-time episodes, and they come with specific actions a listener can take like an upcoming vote, a public comment period, or an important hearing on the calendar. We’ve published one of those so far, episode 7, “Mining on the Edge of the Boundary Waters.” This one is a real-time episode, but it doesn't have a single deadline or public comment form we can point you to. Instead, it has fights breaking out in hundreds of communities across the country all at once—and a window, right now, to understand it while the outcomes can still be affected. This story is also long enough that we've split it into two parts. This is part 1. Part 2 will be released a week from today. You see, something novel is happening in American public life. Since late 2022, one industry has accelerated its expansion to the point of totally reshaping the country's land, water, and power grid at a speed and scale without precedent. As it's moved from town to town, it has produced something we almost never see anymore: broad, bipartisan public opposition. Democrats and Republicans, urban and rural, environmentalists and ranchers—people who agree on almost nothing, standing up to say the same thing: "Nobody asked us." This is the story of the data center boom.
Cold Open
Box Elder County sits in the northwest corner of Utah, covering nearly 6,000 square miles. Its eastern edge flanks the Wasatch Range down to the northeastern shore of the Great Salt Lake. Its western edge forms the state line with Nevada. All of the county's land sits in the Great Basin Desert, the largest desert in the United States. The Great Basin is a cold, high desert that stretches across western Utah, nearly all of Nevada, into Oregon and Idaho to the north, and west toward California. It's speckled by sagebrush flats, dry lakebeds, salt grass, and the pale terraced hillsides left behind by Lake Bonneville, the ancient freshwater sea that once covered most of this part of the West. That sea is long gone. What's left of it—the Great Salt Lake—is in trouble. In the spring of 2026, the lake sat at just 36 percent of its historical capacity. Utah recorded only 19 percent of its normal snowpack last winter, and every part of the state was classified as being in some level of drought. Residents had been told to conserve water. About 65,000 people live in the county, which relies on an agricultural economy built on crops like alfalfa, wheat and sugar beets, and livestock like cattle and sheep. The county is about 80 percent Republican and 60 percent LDS—that's the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the faith whose members are more commonly known as Mormons. It's a religious, conservative, and rural area—not the kind of place anyone expects to become the front line of a national fight over the future of artificial intelligence. But that's exactly what it's become. On Monday, May 4, 2026, more than 1,000 residents of Box Elder County packed the fairgrounds to tell their commissioners a resounding "No" to something called the Stratos Project—a data center campus paired with its own natural gas power plant, proposed to be built in Hansel Valley, an open stretch of sagebrush on the north shore of the Great Salt Lake. The project's backers persuaded Utah's Military Installation Development Authority, or MIDA (MEE-duh), to designate 40,000 acres of the county as the Stratos Project Area—placing that land under MIDA's zoning authority rather than the county's. That acreage figure wouldn't hold thanks to public pushback. We'll get to that part of the story next week.The buildings initially proposed for the Stratos Project would cover fewer than 2,000 acres. But the authority to approve what gets built next, and when, would rest with an unelected state board—MIDA—rather than local residents and elected officials. At full buildout, the project was projected to demand as much as 9 gigawatts of electricity, more than twice what the entire state of Utah currently uses. Interestingly, that number didn't move even after the acreage did—we'll get to that in part 2. Critics say the data center would increase the state's carbon emissions by around 50 percent, exceeding what comes from its entire transportation sector. Asked how much water the facility would use, the development team has said only that the plans are still under design and a number isn't yet possible to give. Backed by the Canadian investor Kevin O'Leary, known to television audiences from the show Shark Tank, the Stratos Project would be among the largest data centers in the world. The Stratos site sits at the edge of what Utah State University physics professor Robert Davies described to the Salt Lake Tribune as a watershed already in collapse. There wasn't a seat to be found that day at the Box Elder County fairgrounds. Residents had been given mere days to evaluate the proposal. They were furious. The rows of folding chairs filled up quickly, and the rest of the space became standing-room only. The three county commissioners—Boyd Bingham, Lee Perry, and Tyler Vincent—sat at the front of the room, listening. At some point, Commissioner Bingham lost his cool. He leaned into the microphone, telling the crowd, "For hell's sakes, grow up." Then he and his colleagues announced they were moving to a video call, got up, and left the room. Many in the crowd responded by yelling one word: "Cowards." A few minutes later, the commissioners reappeared on a screen projected at the front of the room, from somewhere else in the building. They voted yes. What's happening in Box Elder County isn't unusual. Across the country, the same story has been playing out—a community learns, usually late in the process, that a facility the size of a small city is coming to their neighborhood. The questions are the same everywhere. Where does the water come from? What happens to our electricity bills? Who approved this, when did they decide, and why weren’t we told? This is a story about what happens when the largest infrastructure boom in modern American history arrives in communities across the country. About what it does to the water, the air, the electricity bill, and the people who live next door. It's also about who gets a vote, and who doesn't. And about who, in the end, pays for it.
Boilerplate
You're listening to Ecocide, a podcast about environmental disaster. Each episode investigates a moment when human activity collided with the natural world, and follows what happened next, and who was left to deal with the fallout.
Chapter One
A server is a computer. A larger, more specialized computer than the ones we keep in our homes, but a computer all the same. It has processors, memory, and storage, and its job is to handle information at a scale far beyond what any single device can do on its own. At the small end, that means checking your email, streaming a movie, or making a banking transaction. At the large end, servers are running calculations that no human and no individual computer could ever do alone—training artificial intelligence models, generating images and video at a huge scale, processing billions of financial transactions in real time, analyzing satellite imagery and surveillance feeds, simulating weather systems, and running the recommendation engines that decide what billions of people see on their phones every day. A data center is a building, or a complex of buildings, full of those servers. The servers sit in tall metal racks, lined up in rows like library stacks. Cooling systems run around the clock because servers generate an immense amount of heat. Backup power systems run constantly, because if servers lose power, they lose the data too. Security systems are also on 24/7, because the data inside the servers is worth more than the buildings they sit in. For most of their short history, data centers have been smaller. They were warehouses with a lot of cooling equipment, plugged into the grid like any other commercial operation. The first commercial data centers were built in the 1990s, alongside the expansion of the internet. By the early 2000s, they were running banking transactions, e-commerce platforms, hospital records, and government databases. By the 2010s, they were handling streaming video, cloud storage for photos and documents, and the back-end infrastructure of social media. A typical data center from this era might consume 10 or 20 megawatts—enough to power a town of 20,000 to 40,000 people. Then, on November 30, 2022, the company OpenAI released a chatbot called ChatGPT. Within a week, it had more than a million users. That grew to a hundred million within two months. It was, at the time, the fastest-growing consumer product in history. What ChatGPT did that previous chatbots couldn't was respond in fluent, contextual prose. It could write essays, draft emails, explain physics, and even code. Scale is what made it all work. Specifically, the scale of the computers that had trained it. In his 2023 book "The Coming Wave," Mustafa Suleyman—a co-founder of the British AI company DeepMind, which had been acquired by Google—documents that scale shift. In less than 10 years, he wrote, the amount of computing power used to train the largest AI models grew by roughly 5 billion times. The thing that made ChatGPT possible was a data center—or rather, many of them—running the calculations required to teach a machine to predict language, at a scale that no infrastructure on Earth had ever been built to support. The moment ChatGPT broke that record, the largest technology companies in the world—Google, Meta, Microsoft, Amazon, and a wave of new entrants—decided they couldn't afford to be left behind. They started building the infrastructure to develop and deploy AI of their own—not just chatbots, but a new generation of search, advertising, productivity software, image and video generation, recommendation systems, enterprise cloud services they could sell to other companies, and the foundation models that would power all of it. The scale changed in a matter of months. A 2015 data center might draw 10 or 20 megawatts. By 2024, the largest projects were drawing 1,000 megawatts—a full gigawatt—at single facilities. By 2025, hyperscale developers were announcing 2-gigawatt campuses, 5-gigawatt campuses, and 9-gigawatt campuses. The four largest American technology companies spent more than 350 billion dollars on AI infrastructure in 2025 alone. These were no longer just warehouses. They'd turned into industrial cities. One question hangs over all of this. If data centers use this much water and power, is the individual user—the person asking a chatbot a question or generating an image—part of the problem? By OpenAI's own account, a single text query uses about a third of a watt-hour of electricity—but that figure only counts what happens on-site, inside OpenAI's own servers. Independent researchers, led by Shaolei Ren at the University of California, Riverside, have found that once you include the water used upstream to generate that electricity, the real number runs anywhere from 10 to several hundred milliliters per query, depending on the length and complexity of the response. At the individual level, even the higher number is close to a rounding error. But that's not quite where this ends. In the early 2000s, the oil company BP helped popularize the idea of the personal carbon footprint, promoting a calculator that let individuals measure their own contribution to climate change. The framing shifted attention away from the companies extracting and burning fossil fuels at industrial scale, and onto the everyday choices of ordinary people. It created a kind of trickle-down accountability, where the small, private actions of millions of end users get treated as the variable that matters, while the companies that built the system in the first place and use it at scale are rarely asked to answer for it. The same instinct is at work here. But there's a real difference between that comparison and this one. Most Americans have no real alternative to heating their homes or driving to work; those are choices made for them, decades ago, by an economy built around fossil fuels. Using a chatbot isn't like that. Nobody needed one to get to work this morning. And yet AI has been built into nearly every interface on the internet without anyone asking for it. Search results now come back as chatbot paragraphs. Customer service lines route through AI before a person ever picks up. Productivity software, photo apps, even children's toys are being rebuilt around the same infrastructure. The industry is treating all of this as necessary, whether the demand is there or not. So here's the question underneath all of this. It isn't whether using a chatbot makes you responsible for a rezoned farm in Utah or a diesel generator in Virginia. It's who decided this had to happen at this scale, this fast, in your town, without asking you first. It wasn't a vote or a public debate. A handful of technology companies decided, in the space of about three years, to rebuild their products around AI and to build the infrastructure for it wherever land, power, and water could be assembled quickest. The rest of the country was handed the result. Opting out of a chatbot doesn't opt anyone out of paying for the substation, the water right, or the rezoned farmland, because those decisions were made by the companies building this and the officials approving it—not by the people typing questions into a search box. That's the distinction this episode will keep coming back to. The people drinking the water, breathing the exhaust, and paying the higher electric bill didn't choose how fast this got built, where it got sited, or how big it would be. Those choices belonged to the companies racing each other to build first, and to the officials who let them. So this episode is not about whether anyone should feel guilty for using a chatbot. The decisions that shape this story aren't made by users. They're made by the corporations building the infrastructure, the elected officials approving it, and the executives deciding how large to build it before they even know what they'll use it for. Data centers have to be wired into the power grid, plumbed into the water supply, and dropped onto the land. To understand what that does to a place, and how the industry learned to do it at this scale, let's start where the data center boom began. Not in Silicon Valley, but in the farmland of northern Virginia.
Chapter Two
Loudoun County, Virginia, sits about 30 miles west of Washington, D.C. It's a wedge of land between the Potomac River and the Blue Ridge foothills. Until the late 1990s, it was farmland covered with dairy operations and horse pastures. Today, Loudoun County contains the highest concentration of data centers in the world. Approximately 200 facilities are operational, and another 117 are in the development pipeline. According to Loudoun County Supervisor Mike Turner, who represents the district at the heart of the data center corridor, there has not been a single day in the past 15 years when a data center was not under construction in the county. The reason Loudoun ended up this way comes down to two things: one piece of federal infrastructure, and one bureaucratic decision. The federal infrastructure was something called MAE-East —the Metropolitan Area Exchange-East. In the late 1990s, the U.S. government's Advanced Research Projects Agency, ARPA, established MAE-East as a national hub for internet traffic. The actual physical equipment sat in a parking garage in Vienna, Virginia, about 10 miles east of Loudoun. As MAE-East grew, an extensive underground network of fiber-optic cables was laid through northern Virginia to support it. By the time the buildout was finished, Loudoun County had the lowest network latency in the world—in other words, it had the fastest possible movement of data from point A to point B. That advantage exists to this day. The bureaucratic decision happened in the year 2000, when a Loudoun County zoning administrator made a decision that almost no one knew about. The administrator's job was to interpret the county's land-use rules and decide what can be built where. And in that capacity, the administrator ruled that data centers—which were, at the time, still relatively new—should be treated like office buildings rather than industrial facilities. The decision was so far below the level of public attention that Ecocide couldn't track down the name of the person who made it. Regardless, it was one of the most consequential land-use decisions in Virginia's history. Office parks were already permitted across much of Loudoun's commercial-zoned land "by right." "By right" is a land-use planning term that means a developer doesn't need any level of legislative approval. The project simply gets built. In 2008, Loudoun County's Department of Economic Development launched a marketing campaign aimed at internet infrastructure companies. The campaign sold the county's fiber network, its proximity to D.C., and its by-right zoning. It branded the corridor running through eastern Loudoun "Data Center Alley." The name stuck. Over the next 15 years, Data Center Alley exploded. Each new facility added pressure to the power grid and demand for new transmission lines and substations. In 2022, Dominion Energy, the utility that serves northern Virginia, told the regional grid operator that the power demands of Loudoun's data centers had begun to exceed what the utility could deliver. As a result, Dominion began imposing power constraints on new connections in Data Center Alley. The industry's response was to push for more infrastructure, and by 2025 the constraints had largely been resolved through new transmission lines and substations. The question of who pays for all that new infrastructure became one of the central fights in Virginia energy policy. In November 2025, the State Corporation Commission—the state's utility regulator—approved a Dominion rate increase that raised the typical residential bill by about $11 a month, while also creating a new rate class that requires data centers and other large users to cover most of the cost of the infrastructure built to serve them. The stated goal was to keep those costs from landing on residential customers. We'll come back to the broader question of who pays a bit later. The electric bill is one kind of cost. But there's another cost that doesn't show up on a statement. In Sterling, one of the county's data center towns, Jessica Medeiros began noticing black smoke not long after a data center went up in her neighborhood. When the machines behind the building ran, she said, soot drifted down and settled on the ground. The machines were diesel generators. Every large data center has them—sometimes dozens, sometimes hundreds, each one about the size of a train car. They exist for a single purpose. If the power grid fails, the generators fire up within seconds so the servers never go dark, because a data center that loses power even briefly can lose enormous amounts of data and money. The backup has to be instant, and it has to be reliable. To make sure it is, the generators get tested at least once a month. Each test burns diesel fuel, sending exhaust into the air. In Loudoun County, houses are what's nearby. Diesel exhaust carries fine particulate matter—soot particles small enough to lodge deep in the lungs and pass into the bloodstream—along with nitrogen oxides, the gases that help form smog. Decades of medical research tie it to asthma attacks, heart disease, and lung disease. And the pollution from those generators has been climbing across the region. A study by Virginia Commonwealth University's Institute for Sustainable Energy and Environment found that between 2015 and 2023, carbon monoxide from the region's data center generators rose by 196 percent, nitrogen oxides by 111 percent, and fine particulate matter by 139 percent. And that's with the generators running at a fraction of what they're allowed to. The same study found the region's data centers were emitting only 4 to 7 percent of the pollution their permits already authorized. So, there's a whole lot of room for things to get worse. In May 2026, the Washington Post commissioned its own analysis, from researchers at Virginia Commonwealth University and the University of Washington, of every diesel generator permitted at a data center in the state—10,500 of them. Even running for less than an hour a week on average, the analysis found, those generators create the same public health burden as five power plants. That's enough, the researchers concluded, to cause at least three premature deaths in the region every year, just from ordinary, occasional use. If every generator in Virginia ran at the full level its permit allows, the toll would be several times higher—as many as 27 deaths a year, concentrated in Virginia, Maryland, and Washington, D.C. That’s what worries the people fighting these projects, because in many places, the rules are loosening rather than tightening. In a memo dated September 30, 2025, the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality proposed widening the definition of a power-out emergency statewide, which would let data centers fire up their diesel engines at a lower threshold — including in Northern Virginia, the part of the state the EPA already classifies as failing federal limits for smog. A Virginia legislative research report concluded that in a worst-case scenario, data center backup generators could release 9,000 tons of nitrogen oxides across the region in a single year. That's roughly half of everything northern Virginia emits from every other source combined. The human cost of all of this has begun to be measured. The Piedmont Environmental Council, a Warrenton, Virginia-based land-use group, commissioned an analysis of a single permitted facility—eight natural gas turbines and 51 diesel generators—and found it could cause between $53 and $99 million in health damages every year. In Virginia, the generators are at least permitted. Elon Musk's AI company xAI has shown what happens when a company decides not to bother with permits at all. In 2024, xAI built Colossus 1, one of the largest AI data centers in the world, in South Memphis, Tennessee—a majority-Black neighborhood—in just 122 days. Residents found out what was coming when they watched Ted Townsend, the Greater Memphis Chamber of Commerce's CEO, announce it at a press conference on the local news. Mayor Paul Young had known in advance but the city's own elected council members had not — they found out the same way the public did. Nobody asked any of them either. As xAI scaled up, it needed more power than the local grid could deliver. So the company built its own gas plant just across the state line in Southaven, Mississippi, to feed a second facility, Colossus 2, about a mile away in Memphis. Between August and December of 2025, xAI's subsidiary, MZX Tech, installed 27 methane gas turbines at the Southaven site, mounted on trailers. The trailers were the key. By classifying the turbines as mobile, non-road equipment rather than stationary industrial sources, xAI avoided the Clean Air Act permitting process entirely—the same process that would have required public notice, an environmental review, and pollution controls. Mississippi's environmental regulators went along with the classification. Residents near the Southaven site reported a rotten-egg smell in the air. Scientists at the University of Tennessee documented the turbines adding to a region already struggling with air pollution. Krystal Polk, whose family home sits near the facility, had planned to retire there. She watched black fences go up across the street with no warning and no explanation, and told The Guardian she had no idea what was coming. In January 2026, the EPA closed the loophole, ruling that trailer-mounted turbines powering a permanent industrial facility couldn't be classified as mobile equipment, and that they required Clean Air Act permits before operating. xAI kept running them anyway. The opposition organized on both sides of the state line. In Memphis, Memphis Community Against Pollution — co-founded and chaired by Tennessee State Representative Justin Pearson — became the lead local voice, later joining the NAACP's Mississippi State Conference as a named plaintiff. Young, Gifted and Green, a national environmental justice group, showed up at the Southaven public hearings, arguing that xAI's turbines were breaking a federal law the company had no legal option to ignore. In Southaven itself, a group called the Safe and Sound Coalition filed a separate lawsuit in June 2026, alleging that the noise and vibration from the turbines amounted to a public nuisance — three of the coalition's own board members are named as plaintiffs. After months of organizing, the Memphis City Council approved an ordinance directing 25 percent of the tax revenue xAI generates back to the communities closest to the facilities. In April 2026, the NAACP and its Mississippi State Conference, represented by Earthjustice and the Southern Environmental Law Center, sued xAI and MZX Tech under the Clean Air Act, seeking to force the turbines offline and require the pollution controls the law demands. In June, the Justice Department did something unusual: it moved to intervene in a lawsuit it wasn't a party to and asked the court to dismiss it, arguing that shutting down the turbines would threaten national security. A Department of Defense official declared that the Pentagon relies on xAI's Grok Gov model for classified and mission-critical systems—including helping identify and strike more than 2,000 targets in the Iran war. The motion was still pending as the summer wore on. The turbines were still running. Back in Loudoun County, in March 2025, after 25 years of by-right development, the Loudoun County Board of Supervisors finally voted to require legislative approval for new data centers. But that decision came far too late. Northern Virginia is already the data center capital of the world. And none of the people whose homes are now adjacent to industrial complexes the size of football stadiums voted on it.
Chapter Three
By 2022, Loudoun County was running out of room. Land prices had climbed, and the new power constraints in Data Center Alley—the same ones Dominion had just begun imposing—meant developers couldn't count on getting their facilities connected to the grid quickly. So they started looking at surrounding counties. Prince William County sits directly south of Loudoun, the next county down as you move away from Washington DC. Its eastern edge is mostly suburban and its western edge is farmland, forest, and historical battlefields. Manassas National Battlefield Park—the site of the first major land battle of the American Civil War, fought in July 1861—sits inside the county. Bull Run, the creek that gave the battle its other name, runs through it. In June 2022, two real estate firms, QTS Realty Trust and Compass Datacenters, filed a proposal with the Prince William County Board of Supervisors. The project was called the PW Digital Gateway, and the proposal called for the rezoning of 2,100 acres of rural land in the western part of the county for industrial use. The plan envisioned up to 27 million square feet of data center space. The cost would be $24.7 billion dollars. The proposed footprint sat directly adjacent to Manassas National Battlefield Park. Some of the rezoned land had itself been part of the historic battlefield landscape—Civil War troop positions, supply lines, and encampments. Fierce opposition surfaced immediately. A nonprofit called Coalition to Protect Prince William County formed in the weeks after the proposal was filed. The Piedmont Environmental Council threw its significant weight behind the fight. So did the American Battlefield Trust. By the fall of 2022, local meetings about the PW Digital Gateway were drawing standing-room crowds. The county's Board of Supervisors received tens of thousands of comments, the vast majority of which opposed the proposal. In December 2023, after an overnight hearing that ran for 27 hours, the Board of Supervisors voted 4 to 3 to approve the rezoning. The rezoning approval triggered a wave of lawsuits, led by the Oak Valley Homeowners Association and the American Battlefield Trust, with conservation groups including the Piedmont Environmental Council and the National Parks Conservation Association backing them. Their argument was that the Board had rushed the approval through without giving the public proper legal notice of the hearings. In August 2025, a Prince William County judge agreed, declaring the rezoning void from the start. The county and the developers appealed. Then on March 31, 2026, a three-judge panel of the Virginia Court of Appeals ruled unanimously to uphold that decision—finding the county had failed to meet strict public notice requirements under both state law and its own ordinance—and blocked the project for good. On April 14, 2026, the Prince William County Board of Supervisors withdrew from the case, after spending nearly 2 million dollars in taxpayer money defending the rezoning. Compass Datacenters, the smaller of the two developers, dropped its own appeal around the same time. That left QTS—owned by the investment giant Blackstone—alone in the fight. QTS filed one last appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, with three hours to spare before the deadline. Then, on July 2, 2026, QTS gave up too. In a filing with the court, the company said it had decided to terminate the Digital Gateway project. Its statement described years of planning, a rigorous county review process, and the billions of dollars in investment and tax revenue the project would have delivered. It did not mention the community opposition, the voided rezoning, or the unanimous appellate ruling that had actually killed it. The largest data center proposal in the world—37 data centers and 14 substations planned for land beside a Civil War battlefield—was dead. Four years after two real estate firms filed the paperwork, the only thing built on that land was the fight over whether anything else would be. While the Digital Gateway fight was playing out in Prince William, similar battles were breaking out across northern Virginia. In August 2021, in Warrenton, a town of about 10,000 in Fauquier County, the Town Council quietly added data centers as a permitted use in the town's industrial district—slipped onto the consent agenda, the part of a meeting reserved for routine items approved in a single batch without debate, on the same day the council adopted a long-term plan that didn't mention data centers at all. Two years later, in February 2023, the council used that opening to approve Amazon's 220,000-square-foot data center on a 42-acre site near a school and a residential neighborhood, over the objections of more than 500 people who'd shown up to speak against it. The council passed it anyway. Over the next two years, every council member who voted yes was gone—some chose not to run again, and the ones who did were voted out in the next election cycle. The new council dropped the town's legal fight to keep its Amazon communications secret—a fight the previous council had taken all the way to the Virginia Supreme Court. It released more than 3,000 past emails between town officials and the company, and in July 2025 voted unanimously to strike data centers from the town's zoning code entirely. The same turnover played out an hour south in King George County, where a newly elected board canceled a $6 billion Amazon deal its predecessor had approved. Two years later, the county and Amazon are still at an impasse. What the people of northern Virginia learned was that the data center industry had been operating in the dark for two decades, and that once the public understood what was being built and where, the opposition was fierce and bipartisan. That lesson is now spreading across the country.
Chapter Four
Data centers consume electricity at a scale that the American grid was not built to deliver. When a hyperscale data center moves in, the local utility has to build new transmission lines, substations, and often new power plants to serve it. Those projects cost billions of dollars, and the question of who pays for them—the data center, or the public—is the most consequential question in the entire industry; perhaps one of the most consequential questions in American public discourse as a whole right now. In March 2025, the Electricity Law Initiative at Harvard Law School published a report titled "Extracting Profits from the Public." The authors, Eliza Martin and Ari Peskoe, reviewed nearly 50 state regulatory proceedings involving data center electricity contracts. Their conclusion was that, across the country, utilities are shifting the costs of new infrastructure built for data centers onto residential and small-business ratepayers. Here's how it works: In most American states, electric utilities are state-regulated monopolies. They have an exclusive right to deliver electricity within a defined service area, with their prices set by a state utility commission. When the utility builds new infrastructure like a transmission line, a substation, or a power plant, the commission decides how the cost of that infrastructure gets passed on to the utility's customers. The standard rule is called "cost causation." If a new line is built to serve residential customers, then those residential customers pay for it. If a new line is built to serve a steel mill, the steel mill pays for it. The system is supposed to make sure that nobody is subsidizing anyone else's electricity. Martin and Peskoe found that in practice, the cost causation rule is breaking down. When a data center signs a contract with a utility, the contract is typically negotiated in secret. The utility files a confidential proposal with the state utility commission. The commission, often without independent expert review, approves it. The terms—things like the price the data center pays, the infrastructure being built, and the cost allocation—are kept out of the public record. The result is that when new infrastructure is built for a data center, residential and small business ratepayers can end up shouldering most of the added cost without knowing it. In 2024, the largest American grid operator — a company called PJM Interconnection, which manages the electricity grid for 13 states from New Jersey through Illinois — held its annual auction to set the price of generating capacity. The price came in at $270 per megawatt-day. The year before, it had been $29. The price rose by a factor of nearly 10 in a single year. The result, according to PJM's own analysis, would be a price increase passed through to 67 million electricity customers across the region. The next year's auction set a second consecutive record: $329 per megawatt-day, the maximum allowed under a price cap Pennsylvania's governor had negotiated with PJM after the first spike, specifically to keep the number from climbing even higher. PJM identified the cause. Data center demand growth in Virginia, primarily Loudoun County, had exceeded what the existing generation system could supply. In July 2025, the Union of Concerned Scientists analyzed PJM's regional transmission expansion plan and found that data centers were driving 9.3 billion dollars in new transmission costs that ratepayers across the region would absorb, plus another 4.3 billion dollars in costs that had previously been obscured in the planning documents. A separate analysis from Carnegie Mellon University, published in July 2025, projected that data center growth would raise average electricity bills nationally by 8 percent by 2030. In Central and Northern Virginia, the bill increase was projected at more than 25 percent. This has become a pattern. Across the country, the people paying for the data center boom are the residential customers who never agreed to it, who in many cases don't know what's being built where they live, and who are absorbing rate increases that their utility bills don't even break out as a line item. In March 2026, with electricity rates rising in multiple states and political pressure building, President Donald Trump summoned the chief executives of Amazon, Google, Meta, Microsoft, OpenAI, Oracle, and xAI to the White House. The companies signed something called the Ratepayer Protection Pledge—a voluntary commitment that they would cover the costs of new electricity infrastructure built to serve their facilities. The pledge was just a pledge. In fact, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, or FERC, doesn't even have the authority to enforce it. And state commissions are under no obligation to honor it. The pledge was signed. The press cycle moved on quickly. And the rate increases continued. Three months later, the head of the country's largest utility said the choice was no longer just about the bill. It was about whether the lights stayed on. In June 2026, Calvin Butler, the chief executive of Exelon—the largest electric utility in the country by customer count, serving nearly 11 million people—told the Financial Times that the country could face blackouts as soon as 2027, unless utilities were allowed to raise rates enough to fund the infrastructure the grid now needed. That past winter, on some of the coldest days of the year, Exelon had already come close when it was nearly forced to cut power to about 400,000 customers. Butler explained that PJM, the regional grid operator that manages the power supply Exelon and dozens of other utilities draw from, was projecting a 60-gigawatt shortfall over the next decade. In Butler's telling, the rate increases and the blackout risk were the same problem, seen from two different directions. Raise the bill now, or risk the outage later. Butler didn't pretend the industry had seen this coming. The AI companies building these facilities, he said, had been caught flat-footed. They had underestimated the pushback their data centers would draw. And utilities like his, he said, had been made the scapegoat for the resulting bills. Some of that pushback landed close to home. Exelon's Pennsylvania utility, PECO, had asked regulators to raise a typical bill by 35 dollars a month starting in 2027. Governor Josh Shapiro called the request pure greed, and pointed to the company's 814-million-dollar profit the year before as obscene. Two weeks later, PECO withdrew the request. Butler said he'd apologized to the governor for not making the case better. But withdrawing the increase, he said, hadn't made the underlying cost disappear. It had only put it off. Asked why more states hadn't moved to address the coming shortfall, Butler's answered that change is hard. Legislators do well in a crisis, he said, but the trouble was that most of them didn't yet see one. In July, the ratepayer protection pledge changed shape. The Trump administration expanded it beyond the technology companies that signed it in March, adding utilities and the states' own governors as parties to it as well. Whether that expansion changes anything for the residential customers still absorbing the rate increases is, like the pledge itself, voluntary and unenforced. That's the question this chapter opened with, and it's the one it ends on: who pays for the power. The rate increases and blackout risks are real, but right now, there’s no mechanism that makes the data centers driving that demand answer for either one. Butler framed the choice as raising the bill now, or risking the outage later. But that framing treats the shortfall like a shared emergency. It’s not. The demand came from data centers. The decision about how to cover it — raise rates, or run the risk of blackouts — gets made by utilities and regulators, without asking the companies that created the problem to help solve it. Data centers created the shortfall. Someone else decides how it gets paid for. And in may cases, residential and small business customers are the ones who actually pay, whichever way that decision goes.
Chapter Five
Fayette County, Georgia, sits about 20 miles south of Atlanta. Its largest city, Fayetteville, has a population of about 19,000. The county is rural, with low-density residential subdivisions, working farms, and stretches of pine forest. The Flint River—one of the major drinking-water sources for the state of Georgia, serving more than a million people downstream—rises in the county's northern reach. In 2022, the Fayette County Development Authority—a taxpayer-funded quasi-governmental body with an unelected board—brokered the sale of 615 acres of forest and pastureland to QTS Data Centers for $153.8 million dollars. This is the same QTS behind the Digital Gateway, the largest data center proposal in the world, which this episode already followed through years of litigation in Prince William County, Virginia, before it collapsed for good. The Fayette County deal was reported at the time, but hidden in the contract was that $75 million dollars of the sale price went directly to the Development Authority itself. The money flowed into a Development Authority bank account that, as the Fayette County paper The Citizen reported, was not answerable to any local elected government. The data center, when fully built, will be the largest multi-tenant data center campus in the world. 6.2 million square feet of industrial space spanning 13 buildings, with nearly 1,000 megawatts of planned power capacity. At least one completed building is currently housing a Microsoft AI superfactory. QTS markets itself as, in its own words, the global leader in water-free cooling. In February 2026, the company's government relations manager, Gabrielle Delíz, addressed the Fayette County Chamber of Commerce. Delíz explained that QTS uses a closed-loop cooling system, which recirculates water in sealed pipes rather than evaporating it. When a Fayetteville city councilman asked how much water the full campus would require, Delíz said it would use about as much water as a traditional office building. About 2,000 gallons a day. In May 2025, 9 months after Delíz told the Chamber of Commerce that the facility would use 2,000 gallons of water a day, residents in the Annalise Park subdivision near the QTS construction site noticed their water pressure dropping. The Fayette County Water System investigated and reviewed QTS's water consumption records. What they found was that roughly 29 million gallons had been consumed without being billed—the equivalent of 44 Olympic-size swimming pools. The county sent QTS a retroactive bill for $147,000, which QTS paid. The county's explanation was that the billing gap resulted from an error during a system-wide upgrade to new smart meters—one of QTS's meters had not been transferred to the new digital billing system. QTS called any suggestion of improper use categorically false. Vanessa Tigert, the county water director, told Politico the gap was likely about four months. QTS told Politico it was nine to 15.The self-proclaimed global leader in water-free cooling had told the Fayette County Chamber of Commerce, in February 2026, that the campus would use about 2,000 gallons of water a day. Three months later, QTS's own chief operating officer told the Fayette County News that actual average daily usage over the prior year had been 174,000 gallons—87 times what the company had told the public. Whether the billing gap was an error or something else, the water usage discrepancy was not in dispute. Joe and Jean Marschall moved to their wooded corner of Fayette County more than 25 years ago. Then forest land nearby was rezoned, and QTS moved in next door. As CBS News Atlanta reported in March 2026, the Marschalls now live with near-constant industrial noise, fumes, and security lights so bright that Joe Marschall told the reporter he felt like he was under interrogation every night. The Marschalls' biggest concern, though, flows through the creek in their backyard. The creek is part of the headwaters that feed the Flint River. Flint Riverkeeper, a regional advocacy group, has documented a thick orange flocculant substance and heavy sediment in the creek after rain at the QTS site. Flocculant is a chemical used at construction sites to clear suspended particles from water. Using it is legal, but discharging it into waterways is not. QTS's chief operating officer told CBS Atlanta that everything was within compliance, but when CBS asked to tour the facility, QTS refused. In March 2026, the Fayetteville City Council voted to ban new data centers in every zoning district. The QTS project, which was already approved, wasn't affected by the ban. But the vote was its own kind of verdict: the city that had welcomed this campus in 2022 wanted no more of them by 2026.Limited water use wasn't the only promise QTS made. The company also promised jobs. And QTS isn't the only one. Every data center project in this episode has made that same promise to the community that hosts it. Let’s find out what that promise is actually worth.
Chapter Six
The economic case for data centers comes down to two claims: jobs, and tax revenue. The jobs claim deserves a closer look first. In February 2025, the Wall Street Journal ran a piece by reporter Tom Dotan titled "The AI Data-Center Boom Is a Job-Creation Bust." The article, which became one of the most-cited pieces of business journalism of the year, surveyed the actual employment impact of large-scale data centers. Dotan wrote that in Abilene, Texas — the flagship site of Stargate, a $500 billion AI infrastructure buildout backed by OpenAI, Oracle, and SoftBank — 1,500 construction workers were building the first data center, with a projected operational employment, once the facility opened, of 57 permanent jobs. The pattern is consistent. Intensive construction employs thousands of workers for a few years. But once the data center is operational, that same facility might require 30 to 50 permanent staff. In 2024, the Virginia Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission—the state legislature's own nonpartisan watchdog—studied the industry in the state with more data centers than anywhere on Earth. It found that a typical data center of about 250,000 square feet employs roughly 50 full-time workers, and that about half of those are contractors rather than permanent staff. The industry's local pitches sounds different. Jess Peterson is the lobbyist for a Houston-based data center developer called Quantica and its proposed Broadview, Montana, campus. Peterson was selling the project to the town on the jobs it would bring. Asked how many, he told the New York Times in May 2026 that it would create 30, or 40, or maybe 100 permanent positions. He didn't know which. This was the upside he was offering—the return the community would get for handing over 5,000 acres—and he couldn't come close to pinning down the actual number. In November 2025, the economist Michael Hicks, who teaches at Ball State University in Indiana, published the first causal study of data center employment effects in the United States in his Substack "The Country Economist." Hicks used Texas—which keeps detailed public records of every approved data center because of the state's tax-exemption program—as his test case. He compared 25 years of employment numbers in counties that had received a data center to employment in similar counties that had not, controlling for prior growth trends. The finding was that data centers create no statistically significant net long-term employment in their host counties. Hicks's study confirmed what the Wall Street Journal had reported anecdotally. Data centers do not create local jobs at the scale they're telling us. In Fayetteville, Georgia, the job number at the QTS facility has been a moving target. In 2022, the city said the project would create 100 positions. A year later, a columnist at the Fayette County News, the county's local paper, asked QTS directly, but the company wouldn't answer. By June 2025, the Development Authority said 200. Eight months after that, QTS's written statement to WBRC, the local CBS affiliate, claimed 800 to 1,000 permanent jobs. Studies show the average completed data center creates roughly 30 permanent positions, including security guards and maintenance technicians. No written documentation of QTS's actual job commitments has ever been produced. In the most exhaustive analysis of state data center subsidy programs published to date, the Washington-based research group Good Jobs First found that taxpayers in states offering data center subsidies typically pay at least one million dollars per permanent job created. So the job promises aren't kept. In some cases, it's not clear they were ever real. That leaves the second half of the economic case: the tax revenue. Here, the math runs in the wrong direction too, because the same deals that bring the data centers in are built around not paying the taxes. Most states court these projects with sales-and-use tax exemptions—the company buys its servers, its cooling equipment, its backup generators, and in some states its electricity, without paying sales tax on any of it. Servers wear out and get replaced every two to five years, so that exemption isn't a one-time break. It renews every hardware cycle, for as long as the exemption lasts. On top of that, many deals add property-tax abatements that forgive most of what the buildings and land would otherwise owe.Good Jobs First has been adding up what that costs. In Georgia, the state's data center sales-tax exemption drains close to 300 million dollars a year, and the state doesn't disclose which companies receive it. In Virginia—the largest data center market in the world—the exemption forgives close to a billion dollars in sales-and-use tax a year, and the state doesn't disclose the recipients there either.When the group divided the subsidies in Illinois by the permanent jobs those projects created, it came to roughly 1.4 million dollars of forgone public revenue for every job. In one Illinois deal, a single data center promised 20 jobs in exchange for 51 million dollars in tax exemptions—about 2.6 million dollars per job.A deal between Meta and the state of Louisiana shows the same pattern at a larger scale. Meta — the company behind Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp — is building a data center campus in rural Louisiana called Hyperion, a project so large it will eventually run on its own dedicated gas plants. We'll cover that campus in full in part 2 of this story next week. For now, its tax treatment is the point: the state granted Hyperion a 20-year exemption from sales and use taxes on its equipment—including the chips that power its AI training, the most expensive single category of what it buys. One analysis, by the financial news outlet Sherwood News, put the value of that exemption at 3.3 billion dollars. Kasia Tarczynska (Tar-SHIN-ska) of Good Jobs First has tracked these deals for years, and she called the estimate conservative, and said the real number was likely larger than anyone could predict. Indiana shows how invisible these costs can stay. The state hands data centers a sales-tax exemption on their equipment—and in late May 2026, after Good Jobs First and the Indianapolis TV station WTHR pressed for the numbers, the state finally disclosed them: more than 655 million dollars in sales-and-use taxes that data centers hadn't paid. Most of it—561 million—went to a single company, Amazon.The figures had existed all along and they’d been reported to the state's economic development corporation, but they were never routed into the public financial report. Hoosiers were paying sales tax on what they bought. The data centers, on hundreds of millions of dollars of equipment, were not—and the public had no idea.The phrase a community hears is tax base. The promise is that even if the jobs are few, the buildings themselves will pour money into county coffers, schools, and roads. But a building whose taxes have been abated and whose purchases are exempt doesn't fill coffers at all. As Tarczynska put it, the best a community can hope for is a stronger tax base, and that evaporates when the property, sales, and income taxes are abated. Box Elder County, Utah, the site of the Stratos Project referenced at the beginning of the episode, is a case study in how that happens out of public view. The Stratos site sits inside a project area controlled by MIDA—the unelected state authority. MIDA holds not only zoning power, but also tax power. It can levy its own property and sales taxes inside a project area, and it can hand a developer decades-long rebates on the property taxes assessed on everything that gets built. The body deciding how much Stratos pays, and how much it gets back, is the same unelected board that approved Stratos in the first place—and it answers to neither the county nor its voters. The construction jobs and wages are real. But a two-year boom is not an economy. Communities have been told they would get permanent prosperity from these data centers, but what they have actually received is two years of construction traffic, followed by some security guards. And, in many cases, a bill. Not every community pays it. Some find out in time to stop the project before the bill ever comes due.
Chapter Seven
Meredith Sharp ran an herbal skincare business in Franklin Township, on the south side of Indianapolis, in Marion County, Indiana. And she lived just a few blocks from where Google wanted to build a data center. The proposal called for nearly 500 acres. When Sharp learned what was coming, she and her neighbors formed a group called Protect Franklin Township. They launched petitions, ran digital ads, and bought billboards. And Sharp, the mother of three who had never done anything like this before, started leading protests in downtown Indianapolis. On September 22, 2025, the group gathered outside the Indianapolis City-County Building, ahead of a vote on the rezoning Google needed. Just hours later, before the vote was held, Google withdrew its proposal. The community had won. Franklin Township wasn't an isolated case in Indiana. It's a state fighting itself. Indiana's state government has become one of the most aggressive data center recruiters in the country: in 2019, the state passed a sales tax exemption for data center equipment, which it later extended to as long as 50 years — a giveaway whose true cost the state wouldn't disclose for years. Meanwhile, Indiana's counties, and the residents inside them, have pushed back hard. By 2025, the Citizens Action Coalition—a consumer advocacy group that tracks the issue—counted nearly 30 active data center projects across the state. But not every county was on board. At least 11 of those projects had already been withdrawn. And 13 Indiana counties had passed moratoriums on new data center development. One county, Marshall County in the north, had banned them outright. In early 2026, state lawmakers considered a bill that would have sent a small share of the tax savings—one percent—to local governments. It was attached to a separate provision that would have let developers build on certain farmland without a public hearing at all. The backlash to that provision was sharp enough that its own sponsor withdrew it. A second bill, which would have simply required state regulators to study what data centers were doing to the grid, never advanced past its first reading. Indiana is a so-called "dark state," meaning the state doesn't publicly disclose which companies receive its subsidies, or how much. No state agency in Indiana is even required to track where data centers are being built. The legislature passes the incentives and the companies collect them. And until residents like Meredith Sharp started showing up, very little of it was visible to the public. The opposition in Indiana has been bipartisan, organized around the things neighbors tend to agree on regardless of party—drinking water, electricity bills, and whether their voices matter. The fights have centered on the same question being asked everywhere else: who pays for the electricity? In northeast Indiana, the utility Indiana Michigan Power—headquartered in Fort Wayne—projected that its peak demand would roughly double by 2030, from about 4 gigawatts to 8, driven almost entirely by hyperscale data centers. Indiana moved earlier than most states to deal with that. In late 2024, Indiana Michigan Power, the state's ratepayer advocate, the Citizens Action Coalition, and the data center companies themselves—Amazon, Google, and Microsoft—signed a settlement that requires large-load customers to pay for the grid upgrades built to serve them, so those costs aren't passed to residential ratepayers. Regulators approved it in February 2025.Since then, the idea has spread fast. By the end of 2025, utilities in 34 states had created these special rates for large power users, according to the energy outlet Latitude Media—among them Virginia's own Dominion from earlier in the episode. The protection the people of Indiana fought for is becoming more common. But a rate class is a narrow kind of win. It governs who pays for new power lines. It says nothing about how much water a facility draws, what its generators do to the air, how much land it takes, or whether the public ever gets to weigh in before the deal is done. And on the one thing it does cover — the electricity bill — it's still limited. A rate class mostly stops future costs from shifting onto residential customers. It doesn't undo the increases that already happened. The reason Indiana even got that far was that the public showed up—at the regulatory commission, at county meetings, and outside the Indianapolis City-County Building on the September afternoon that Google walked away.
Outro
Everything in part one of this two-part episode has been about cost. The electric bill that goes up across 13 states because of construction in one Virginia county. The diesel exhaust settling on a lawn in Sterling. The 29 million gallons that went unbilled in Fayette County, Georgia. The jobs that didn't materialize in Abilene or Fayetteville. The 655 million dollars in Indiana taxes that were never collected, and never disclosed. Every one of those costs is documented. But look at when that documentation arrived. The Washington Post's generator analysis came out in 2026, more than two decades after Loudoun County started building. The Indiana tax figures came out in May 2026, seven years after the exemption passed. The Fayette County water discrepancy surfaced because a subdivision noticed its water pressure dropping, not because anyone was required to report it. In almost every community we’ve visited, the facts arrived after the decision was already made — and in most cases, after a decision that no one had ever voted on at all. That’s not a coincidence, nor is it a failure of local journalism. It is a feature, not a bug, of how these deals are built. Meredith Sharp and her neighbors in Franklin Township won because they found out in time. Most communities don't. In part two, we'll show you why. The non-disclosure agreements local officials sign before they're allowed to know what they're agreeing to. The code names that keep trillion-dollar corporations anonymous through the entire approval process. The state laws that put the negotiations beyond the reach of the regulators who are supposed to be watching. And what happens when the industry stops needing local approval at all. And we'll go back to Box Elder County, Utah—to the fairgrounds where more than a thousand people came to ask where the water was going to come from, and watched three county commissioners walk out of the room rather than answer them. If you want to follow the fights in this episode, several organizations are doing the work. In Virginia, the Coalition to Protect Prince William County, the Piedmont Environmental Council, the American Battlefield Trust, and the National Parks Conservation Association have led the fight against the Digital Gateway and tracked the health costs of gas-powered data centers in Loudoun County. In Georgia, Flint Riverkeeper has documented what QTS's campus is doing to the Flint River watershed. In Indiana, the Citizens Action Coalition tracks data center projects statewide, and Protect Franklin Township is the group Meredith Sharp and her neighbors built to stop Google's proposal — and won. Good Jobs First publishes the most detailed tracking anywhere of what states are giving away in data center subsidies, state by state. And in Memphis and Southaven, Memphis Community Against Pollution has been the lead community voice organizing against xAI's turbines. Young, Gifted and Green, a national environmental justice group, has been active in the Southaven public hearings on the same fight. The Safe and Sound Coalition represents Southaven residents pursuing their own legal case over noise and vibration from the turbines.You can learn more about all of these organizations and find links to donate at ecocidepod.com/organizations.The stories in this podcast don't end when the episode does. For updates on ongoing cases, follow-up reporting, and new episodes as they're released, find us on Instagram at ecocidepod or sign up for the newsletter at ecocidepod.com/newsletter.
Ecocide is a narrative podcast about environmental destruction—part environmental history, part stories still unfolding. Each episode documents an ecological disaster: who caused it, who paid the price, and who fought back. These are stories about what humans do to the natural world, and what it takes to reckon with it.
SOURCES
Online Articles & Investigative Journalism
Salt Lake Tribune — Robert Davies interview, "watershed already in collapse"
The Wall Street Journal — Tom Dotan, "The AI Data-Center Boom Is a Job-Creation Bust" (Feb. 2025)
The New York Times — Jess Peterson interview, Broadview, Montana job-creation claims (May 2026)
Financial Times — Calvin Butler (Exelon CEO) interview (June 2026)
Politico — Vanessa Tigert / QTS water billing dispute coverage
The Citizen (Fayette County) — Development Authority bank account reporting
Fayette County News — QTS job-number and water-usage coverage
CBS News Atlanta — Marschall family interview; QTS compliance statement
WBRC (Birmingham CBS affiliate) — QTS written job-count statement
Fauquier Now — Warrenton, Virginia data center hearing coverage
Sherwood News — Hyperion tax exemption valuation analysis
WTHR (Indianapolis) — Indiana data center tax exemption disclosure investigation
Latitude Media — 34-states/65-rates large-load utility rate tracking
Ted Townsend (Greater Memphis Chamber of Commerce CEO) — public announcement, Colossus 1 (June 2024)
Agency Records & Government Data
Virginia Department of Environmental Quality — memo proposing widened emergency-generator threshold (Sept. 30, 2025)
Virginia General Assembly — legislative research report on data center generator NOx emissions (worst-case 9,000-ton projection)
Virginia State Corporation Commission — Dominion rate order and new large-user rate class (Nov. 2025)
Virginia Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission (JLARC) — data center employment impact study (2024)
PJM Interconnection — capacity auction results (2024, 2025)
Fayette County Water System — investigation and retroactive billing records, QTS
Fayette County Development Authority — land sale and disbursement records (2022)
Indiana Michigan Power / Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission — large-load ratepayer settlement (approved Feb. 2025)
Indiana state economic development corporation — sales-and-use tax exemption records (disclosed May 2026)
EPA — ruling on trailer-mounted turbine classification under the Clean Air Act (Jan. 2026)
Memphis City Council — ordinance directing 25% of xAI tax revenue to affected communities
Court Documents & Legal Filings
Prince William County Circuit Court — ruling voiding Digital Gateway rezoning (Aug. 2025)
Virginia Court of Appeals — unanimous ruling upholding the void rezoning (March 31, 2026)
QTS Realty Trust — withdrawal filing, Virginia Supreme Court (July 2, 2026)
Virginia Supreme Court — Warrenton/Amazon communications-secrecy litigation record
NAACP and NAACP Mississippi State Conference v. xAI and MZX Tech — Clean Air Act lawsuit (filed April 2026; counsel: Earthjustice, Southern Environmental Law Center)
U.S. Department of Justice — motion to intervene and dismiss, xAI litigation (June 2026)
U.S. Department of War — declaration on Grok Gov's role in classified/military systems, filed in support of DOJ motion
Safe and Sound Coalition v. xAI/MZX Tech — nuisance lawsuit, Southaven, MS (filed June 2026)
Academic & Scientific Literature
Mustafa Suleyman, The Coming Wave (2023) — cited for AI compute-growth figures
Shaolei Ren et al., University of California, Riverside — independent research on AI query water/electricity consumption
Virginia Commonwealth University, Institute for Sustainable Energy and Environment — data center generator pollution trend study (2015–2023)
Washington Post commissioned analysis, researchers from Virginia Commonwealth University and the University of Washington — statewide diesel generator health-burden analysis (May 2026)
Piedmont Environmental Council commissioned analysis — single-facility health damages study
Michael Hicks, Ball State University — "The Country Economist" (Substack), causal study of data center employment effects (Nov. 2025)
Eliza Martin and Ari Peskoe, Electricity Law Initiative, Harvard Law School — "Extracting Profits from the Public" (March 2025)
Union of Concerned Scientists — analysis of PJM regional transmission expansion plan (July 2025)
Carnegie Mellon University — national and regional electricity bill impact projection (July 2025)
University of Tennessee researchers — air pollution documentation, Southaven turbine site
Advocacy & Watchdog Organization Reports
Kasia Tarczynska / Good Jobs First — "Cloudy Data, Costly Deals" (Nov. 2025); ongoing state subsidy tracking
Coalition to Protect Prince William County
American Battlefield Trust
National Parks Conservation Association
Oak Valley Homeowners Association
Flint RiverkeeperCitizens Action Coalition (Indiana)
Protect Franklin Township
Memphis Community Against Pollution
Young, Gifted and Green